Highlights with my comments in blue.
Oil demand is expected to contract by 80 kb/d this year, as the Iran war upends our global outlook. This is 730 kb/d less than in last month’s Report and a forecast 1.5 mb/d 2Q26 decline would be the sharpest since Covid-19 slashed fuel consumption. Initially, the deepest cuts in oil use have come in the Middle East and Asia Pacific, mainly for naphtha, LPG and jet fuel. However, demand destruction will spread as scarcity and higher prices persist.
Global oil supply plummeted by 10.1 mb/d to 97 mb/d in March, with continued attacks on energy infrastructure in the Middle East and ongoing restrictions to tanker movements through the Strait of Hormuz leading to the largest disruption in history. OPEC+ production fell 9.4 mb/d m-o-m to 42.4 mb/d while non-OPEC+ supply declined 770 kb/d m-o-m to 54.7 mb/d, as lower Qatari output offset gains in Brazil and the United States.
Global crude throughputs continue to struggle with disruptions to feedstock supplies and infrastructure damage that are tightening global product markets. In April, Middle East and feedstock-constrained refineries in Asia have cut runs by around 6 mb/d, to 77.2 mb/d. Global crude runs are now expected to decline by 1 mb/d on average in 2026, to 82.9 mb/d. Refining margins temporarily surged as middle distillate cracks reached all-time highs.
Global observed oil inventories fell by 85 mb in March, with stocks outside of the Middle East Gulf drawn down by a significant 205 mb (-6.6 mb/d) as flows through the Strait of Hormuz were choked off. At the same time, with limited outlets after the effective closure of the Strait, floating storage of crude and oil products in the Middle East rose by 100 mb and onshore crude stocks in the region were up by 20 mb. China added 40 mb of crude to tanks.
Oil prices posted their largest-ever monthly gain in March in the wake of the most severe oil supply shock in history. Spot crude benchmarks and differentials soared, outpacing futures markets, as refiners anxiously scrambled to replace locked in Middle Eastern cargoes. At the time of writing, North Sea Dated crude was trading around $130/bbl – $60/bbl above pre-conflict levels. < It is important to note that spot market prices for crude oil are much higher than the NYMEX front month (MAY26) that you see in the news.
Disruptions mount
The announcement last week of a two-week ceasefire in the conflict in the Middle East provided some welcome respite to global oil markets just as the impact of disruptions to supply and trade were spreading globally. However, at the time of writing, it remains unclear whether the ceasefire will turn into a lasting peace and a return to regular shipping flows through the Strait of Hormuz. With oil-importing nations scrambling to source replacement barrels from an increasingly shrinking pool of supply, physical crude oil prices surged to record levels near $150/bbl, far above the prices in futures markets, with the physical-futures disconnect becoming increasingly acute. Even steeper gains have been seen for refined products, with middle distillate prices in Singapore reaching all-time highs above $290/bbl.
Resuming flows through the Strait of Hormuz remains the single most important variable in easing the pressure on energy supplies, prices and the global economy. The latest development in the fast-evolving situation is the announced US blockade on vessels entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas, which was due to go into effect soon after the time of writing. In early April, shipments through the Strait remained severely restricted, with loadings of crude, natural gas liquids and refined products averaging around 3.8 mb/d, compared with more than 20 mb/d in February ahead of the crisis. Exports through alternative routes – most notably from the west coast of Saudi Arabia and Fujairah on the east coast of the UAE, as well as the ITP pipeline that runs from Iraq to Ceyhan in Türkiye – had increased to 7.2 mb/d from less than 4 mb/d before the war. The overall loss in oil exports exceeds 13 mb/d, with associated production curtailment and damage to energy infrastructure in the region resulting in cumulative supply losses of more than 360 mb in March and 440 mb projected for April. < Damage to energy infrastructure in the Middle East will extent the time it takes to rebalance the global oil market once the Strait of Hormuz is open, which is still an uncertain date.
Consumers and refiners alike are tapping into oil inventories to mitigate the immediate impact of supply disruptions. In March, global observed oil stocks fell by 85 mb despite an accumulation of both on-land and offshore inventories in the Middle East and further builds in China. The largest decline came from oil on water following the near halt to sailings from Gulf producers dependent on the Strait. Crude oil stocks in importing countries in Asia dropped by 31 mb, with further declines expected in April.
Where oil inventories could not bridge the gap, demand has taken a hit. Most notably, Asian petrochemical producers have curtailed operating rates as feedstock supply dried up. Households and businesses using LPG have also been impacted, while flight cancellations across the Middle East, parts of Asia and Europe have led to a sharp drop in jet fuel consumption. A growing number of countries have implemented policies to reduce demand, while others have put in place measures to shield consumers from the full impact of rising fuel prices. Overall, global oil demand is estimated to contract by 800 kb/d year-on-year in March and by 2.3 mb/d in April. Global oil demand is now projected to decline by 80 kb/d on average in 2026, compared to growth of 730 kb/d expected in last month’s Report. < The demand is still there, but oil-based transportation fuels are being "rationed by price" in many countries. Demand falls in response to higher prices and in many areas the lack of physical supply.
The prospects for a lasting negotiated settlement to the conflict remain unclear at this stage. In this Report, we present a forecast that assumes a resumption of regular deliveries of oil and gas from the Middle East to international markets by mid-year, although not back to pre-conflict levels.
We recognise that this scenario could prove too optimistic, considering the high degree of uncertainty over how the situation may develop. We also present an alternative case where risks to energy production and trade in the Middle East remain high due to a prolonged conflict (see Strait Down – Stocks Draw as the Loss of Hormuz Flows Tightens Balances). In this case, energy markets and economies around the world need to brace for significant disruptions in the months to come.
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Bottomline: IEA is telling the market that if the Strait of Hormuz is not opened soon, it will take well into 2027 before the global oil market is rebalanced. IN MY OPINION a paper agreement is not an end to the conflict because Iran cannot be trusted to abide by any paper agreement. When the Strait is opened, many oil tankers will leave as soon as they can, but few will return until they are certain the war is over. The lack of confidence in a lasting peace in the Middle East is what will keep the global oil market tight much longer than most people realize. A geopolitical risk premium will remain on the price of oil.
The global oil market is no longer functioning as a price-discovery mechanism—it is operating as a scarcity-allocation system, where access to physical supply overrides all traditional market signals.
IEA Oil Market Report released April 14
IEA Oil Market Report released April 14
Dan Steffens
Energy Prospectus Group
Energy Prospectus Group
Re: IEA Oil Market Report released April 14
Oil Market Shock – Structural Breakdown of the Global Energy System
The April 2026 Oil Market Report reflects a profound transformation in the global energy landscape, where geopolitical conflict has escalated into a full-scale structural disruption. The Iran war has not merely introduced volatility—it has fundamentally impaired the physical architecture of global oil supply. At the center of this crisis lies the effective shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical transit corridor responsible for a substantial share of global crude flows. Its paralysis has triggered an immediate and severe contraction in available supply, pushing the system into an unprecedented state of imbalance.
This is not a conventional supply shock driven by policy or cyclical underinvestment; it is a logistical and geopolitical breakdown that has rendered large volumes of oil inaccessible. As a result, global oil flows have collapsed at a speed and magnitude never previously observed, forcing a rapid repricing of risk across energy markets. The implications extend far beyond commodities, reshaping inflation expectations, trade balances, and the broader macroeconomic outlook.
Read a lot more here: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/oil-market-report-analysis-april-2026-041426-0110-pm-faisal-amjad-o8aaf/
The April 2026 Oil Market Report reflects a profound transformation in the global energy landscape, where geopolitical conflict has escalated into a full-scale structural disruption. The Iran war has not merely introduced volatility—it has fundamentally impaired the physical architecture of global oil supply. At the center of this crisis lies the effective shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical transit corridor responsible for a substantial share of global crude flows. Its paralysis has triggered an immediate and severe contraction in available supply, pushing the system into an unprecedented state of imbalance.
This is not a conventional supply shock driven by policy or cyclical underinvestment; it is a logistical and geopolitical breakdown that has rendered large volumes of oil inaccessible. As a result, global oil flows have collapsed at a speed and magnitude never previously observed, forcing a rapid repricing of risk across energy markets. The implications extend far beyond commodities, reshaping inflation expectations, trade balances, and the broader macroeconomic outlook.
Read a lot more here: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/oil-market-report-analysis-april-2026-041426-0110-pm-faisal-amjad-o8aaf/
Dan Steffens
Energy Prospectus Group
Energy Prospectus Group
Re: IEA Oil Market Report released April 14
The Emergence of Acute Physical Scarcity
The most defining feature of the current market environment is the emergence of extreme physical scarcity. Spot crude markets have decoupled sharply from futures pricing, reflecting an urgent scramble for immediate supply. Refiners and end-users are no longer transacting based on forward expectations but are instead competing aggressively for available barrels in real time. This has driven physical prices to extraordinary premiums, signaling a market where access—not cost—is the primary constraint.
Futures markets, by contrast, continue to reflect an assumption of eventual normalization, creating a widening disconnect between paper and physical markets. This divergence is a critical signal for traders: it indicates that the shortage is not theoretical or sentiment-driven, but deeply embedded in the physical supply chain. The pricing mechanism itself is fragmenting under the pressure of constrained logistics and limited deliverable supply.
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Backwardation in the Futures Market is based on the False Paradigm that the global oil market will rebalance quickly after the U.S. gets a "Paper Agreement" with Iran AND Israel and Hezbollah also stop fighting in Lebanon. When has Iran abided by any paper agreement?
The most defining feature of the current market environment is the emergence of extreme physical scarcity. Spot crude markets have decoupled sharply from futures pricing, reflecting an urgent scramble for immediate supply. Refiners and end-users are no longer transacting based on forward expectations but are instead competing aggressively for available barrels in real time. This has driven physical prices to extraordinary premiums, signaling a market where access—not cost—is the primary constraint.
Futures markets, by contrast, continue to reflect an assumption of eventual normalization, creating a widening disconnect between paper and physical markets. This divergence is a critical signal for traders: it indicates that the shortage is not theoretical or sentiment-driven, but deeply embedded in the physical supply chain. The pricing mechanism itself is fragmenting under the pressure of constrained logistics and limited deliverable supply.
---------------
Backwardation in the Futures Market is based on the False Paradigm that the global oil market will rebalance quickly after the U.S. gets a "Paper Agreement" with Iran AND Israel and Hezbollah also stop fighting in Lebanon. When has Iran abided by any paper agreement?
Dan Steffens
Energy Prospectus Group
Energy Prospectus Group
Re: IEA Oil Market Report released April 14
From a highly respected research firm.
The S&P 500 closed Monday at its highest level since late February, erasing every point of decline accumulated since the Iran war began seven weeks ago. The index rose 1.0% on the session after President Trump told reporters that Iran had called and wants a deal "very badly." Prompt Oman crude settled at $103.19 and has dropped by about 30 cents this morning. Brent settled near $99, having retraced from a Sunday night spike above $103, and the VIX slipped back to 18 from 25 last week and 31 two weeks ago. The equity tape says the war is over.
The IEA's April Oil Market Report, published this morning, says something different. Global oil supply plummeted 10.1 million b/d in March to 97 million b/d, the largest single-month disruption in the history of the world petroleum market. OPEC+ output fell 9.4 million b/d month-over-month to 42.4 million b/d. Loadings through the Strait of Hormuz in early April averaged 3.8 million b/d of crude, NGLs, and products against a pre-war run rate above 20 million b/d. Alternative export routes from Yanbu, Fujairah, and the Iraq-Turkey pipeline at Ceyhan have been pushed to 7.2 million b/d, nearly double the pre-war volume, but the net loss in seaborne exports still exceeds 13 million b/d. The IEA now projects global oil demand will decline by 80 thousand b/d in 2026, a downward revision of 730 thousand b/d from last month's forecast of +650 thousand b/d growth, largely due to local shortages in supply. Global observed inventories outside the Middle East Gulf fell by 205 million barrels in March alone. Within the Gulf, crude and products are piling up because there is no way to move them: floating storage rose 100 million barrels and onshore stocks added another 20 million barrels. Molecules exist. They cannot reach the markets that need them. Barrels never loaded cannot be unloaded.
The Islamabad talks produced no agreement after long hours of negotiation. Vice President Vance cited Iran's refusal to renounce nuclear enrichment. Tehran's demands included control of the Strait, war reparations, a regional ceasefire encompassing Lebanon, and release of frozen assets. Trump ordered a U.S. naval blockade of all vessels entering or exiting Iranian ports, effective 10 a.m. ET Monday. CENTCOM specified that freedom of navigation for vessels transiting to non-Iranian ports would not be impeded, a distinction the physical market must now test with actual hulls. Three tankers cleared the Strait on Saturday before talks collapsed. This morning markets are tracking the progress of a U.S.-sanctioned tanker, Rich Starry, as it exits the Strait in an apparent test of the U.S. blockade by China-linked entities.
The restoration of Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline to its full 7 million b/d capacity is the single most constructive physical-market development since the war began. The 746-mile conduit from Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea was damaged by a strike on one of its 11 pumping stations hours after the April 7 ceasefire. Engineers repaired it within days. Output at the offshore Manifa field (300 thousand b/d) has been restored. Work continues at Khurais (300 thousand b/d still offline). The pipeline's rehabilitation means Saudi Arabia can continue routing barrels around the Strait, but it does not solve the underlying problem. The Kingdom has quadrupled Red Sea shipments since February, yet even combined with Iraqi and Emirati bypass volumes, the IEA's data show total alternative flows replace barely a third of the Gulf's normal export slate. EIA estimates production shut-ins will rise to 9.1 million b/d in April from 7.5 million b/d in March.
The equity market's sanguine posture rests on a specific bet: that Trump's statement about Iranian outreach leads to a second round of talks, which leads to a reopening, which leads to normalization. Each link in that chain is plausible. None is certain. The ceasefire expires April 21. Iran's IRGC has warned that any military vessel approaching the Strait constitutes a violation. Mines remain in the waterway, and Iran has acknowledged it lost track of some of them. The U.S. has dispatched two Avenger-class minesweepers from Japan. Energy Secretary Wright told the Semafor conference Monday that oil prices will remain "high, and maybe even rising" until "meaningful ship traffic" clears Hormuz, which he anticipates "sometime in the next few weeks." That is a remarkably honest concession from a cabinet official whose president is simultaneously telling markets the war is essentially won.
READ THIS CAREFULLY:
IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol spoke yesterday at the Atlantic Council. His framing deserves direct attention. He points out the 1973 embargo removed roughly 5 million b/d of supply. The 1979 Iranian revolution also removed roughly 5 million b/d. Both triggered global recessions. The current disruption has removed more than 12 million b/d of oil supply and 20 percent of global LNG supply, with cascading effects through petrochemicals, fertilizers, and sulfur. Birol adds these numbers up to conclude the current crisis is a “triple shock” (oil, gas, food/fertilizer) that “surpasses in severity the shocks of 1973, 1979, and 2022 combined.”
Director Birol’s belated turnabout is remarkable. For years, he blithely ignored energy security and focused solely on his narrow view of energy transition. In May 2021, he famously scolded the world that “there can be no new investments in oil, gas and coal, from now—from this year.” Now he sees the greatest threat to global energy security in history. Yet, a careful and dispassionate observer will notice two important omissions from Birol’s framing: (1) his sums do not compensate for the changing size of world liquids demand from 1973 (56 million b/d) to 1979 (64 million b/d) to 2022 (101 million b/d) to 2026 (104 million b/d), and (2) he glides by the large shifts in shares of world oil supply mix for OPEC (55 percent in 1973 to 31 percent in 2025) and the United States (16 percent in 1979 to 21 percent in 2025). Birol is also a reluctant convert. He recognizes energy security now largely as a foil to promote his political agenda for a rapid pivot to “new energy architecture.” The question before the house is whether Birol’s comments yesterday are the best assessment of the current state of global energy affairs or another contrarian indicator.
Equities seem to have a view. Against this backdrop, the S&P 500 has recovered to pre-war levels. Goldman Sachs reported Monday that its FICC revenue fell 10 percent year-over-year despite the most volatile commodity environment in decades, an outcome that suggests the franchise was positioned defensively rather than aggressively through the disruption. JPMorgan Chase (JPM) and Wells Fargo (WFC) reported this morning. JPM showed a +13% increase in net income to $16.5 billion ($5.94 per share vs Street at $5.45). WFC showed a +7% increase in earnings. The question is whether executives can credibly guide forward through diesel above $5.65 per gallon and a strait that remains functionally closed. Birol’s assumption that oil shock always trigger recession is too glib. The true answer is maybe.
The physical market and the equity market are not pricing two incompatible realities. But one is feverishly jumping from the sickbed without medicine, while the other sees the pain before the cure. We observe that barrels take their lumps faster than share prices, and that the IEA's 205 million barrel draw from non-Gulf inventories in a single month is not a temperature reading that falls on a phone call. U.S. Energy Secretary Wright is correct: prices stay high until hulls clear the Strait. No hulls have cleared in commercial volume. The cure for this crisis is not a deal. The cure is a tanker, fully laden, arriving at a discharge port in Ulsan or Jamnagar or Rotterdam on a schedule the buyer can underwrite. Until that happens, the pain is the price, and the price is the truth.
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Bottomline: There is no "Quick Fix" for the damage that has been done to the world's most important supply chain. This world runs on fossil fuels and more $Trillions spent on windmills and solar panels will NOT change that. The NYMEX strip is not a forecast and spot market oil prices remain much higher than the strip. A "Paper Agreement" with Iran is not worth much more than the paper it is written on.
The S&P 500 closed Monday at its highest level since late February, erasing every point of decline accumulated since the Iran war began seven weeks ago. The index rose 1.0% on the session after President Trump told reporters that Iran had called and wants a deal "very badly." Prompt Oman crude settled at $103.19 and has dropped by about 30 cents this morning. Brent settled near $99, having retraced from a Sunday night spike above $103, and the VIX slipped back to 18 from 25 last week and 31 two weeks ago. The equity tape says the war is over.
The IEA's April Oil Market Report, published this morning, says something different. Global oil supply plummeted 10.1 million b/d in March to 97 million b/d, the largest single-month disruption in the history of the world petroleum market. OPEC+ output fell 9.4 million b/d month-over-month to 42.4 million b/d. Loadings through the Strait of Hormuz in early April averaged 3.8 million b/d of crude, NGLs, and products against a pre-war run rate above 20 million b/d. Alternative export routes from Yanbu, Fujairah, and the Iraq-Turkey pipeline at Ceyhan have been pushed to 7.2 million b/d, nearly double the pre-war volume, but the net loss in seaborne exports still exceeds 13 million b/d. The IEA now projects global oil demand will decline by 80 thousand b/d in 2026, a downward revision of 730 thousand b/d from last month's forecast of +650 thousand b/d growth, largely due to local shortages in supply. Global observed inventories outside the Middle East Gulf fell by 205 million barrels in March alone. Within the Gulf, crude and products are piling up because there is no way to move them: floating storage rose 100 million barrels and onshore stocks added another 20 million barrels. Molecules exist. They cannot reach the markets that need them. Barrels never loaded cannot be unloaded.
The Islamabad talks produced no agreement after long hours of negotiation. Vice President Vance cited Iran's refusal to renounce nuclear enrichment. Tehran's demands included control of the Strait, war reparations, a regional ceasefire encompassing Lebanon, and release of frozen assets. Trump ordered a U.S. naval blockade of all vessels entering or exiting Iranian ports, effective 10 a.m. ET Monday. CENTCOM specified that freedom of navigation for vessels transiting to non-Iranian ports would not be impeded, a distinction the physical market must now test with actual hulls. Three tankers cleared the Strait on Saturday before talks collapsed. This morning markets are tracking the progress of a U.S.-sanctioned tanker, Rich Starry, as it exits the Strait in an apparent test of the U.S. blockade by China-linked entities.
The restoration of Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline to its full 7 million b/d capacity is the single most constructive physical-market development since the war began. The 746-mile conduit from Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea was damaged by a strike on one of its 11 pumping stations hours after the April 7 ceasefire. Engineers repaired it within days. Output at the offshore Manifa field (300 thousand b/d) has been restored. Work continues at Khurais (300 thousand b/d still offline). The pipeline's rehabilitation means Saudi Arabia can continue routing barrels around the Strait, but it does not solve the underlying problem. The Kingdom has quadrupled Red Sea shipments since February, yet even combined with Iraqi and Emirati bypass volumes, the IEA's data show total alternative flows replace barely a third of the Gulf's normal export slate. EIA estimates production shut-ins will rise to 9.1 million b/d in April from 7.5 million b/d in March.
The equity market's sanguine posture rests on a specific bet: that Trump's statement about Iranian outreach leads to a second round of talks, which leads to a reopening, which leads to normalization. Each link in that chain is plausible. None is certain. The ceasefire expires April 21. Iran's IRGC has warned that any military vessel approaching the Strait constitutes a violation. Mines remain in the waterway, and Iran has acknowledged it lost track of some of them. The U.S. has dispatched two Avenger-class minesweepers from Japan. Energy Secretary Wright told the Semafor conference Monday that oil prices will remain "high, and maybe even rising" until "meaningful ship traffic" clears Hormuz, which he anticipates "sometime in the next few weeks." That is a remarkably honest concession from a cabinet official whose president is simultaneously telling markets the war is essentially won.
READ THIS CAREFULLY:
IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol spoke yesterday at the Atlantic Council. His framing deserves direct attention. He points out the 1973 embargo removed roughly 5 million b/d of supply. The 1979 Iranian revolution also removed roughly 5 million b/d. Both triggered global recessions. The current disruption has removed more than 12 million b/d of oil supply and 20 percent of global LNG supply, with cascading effects through petrochemicals, fertilizers, and sulfur. Birol adds these numbers up to conclude the current crisis is a “triple shock” (oil, gas, food/fertilizer) that “surpasses in severity the shocks of 1973, 1979, and 2022 combined.”
Director Birol’s belated turnabout is remarkable. For years, he blithely ignored energy security and focused solely on his narrow view of energy transition. In May 2021, he famously scolded the world that “there can be no new investments in oil, gas and coal, from now—from this year.” Now he sees the greatest threat to global energy security in history. Yet, a careful and dispassionate observer will notice two important omissions from Birol’s framing: (1) his sums do not compensate for the changing size of world liquids demand from 1973 (56 million b/d) to 1979 (64 million b/d) to 2022 (101 million b/d) to 2026 (104 million b/d), and (2) he glides by the large shifts in shares of world oil supply mix for OPEC (55 percent in 1973 to 31 percent in 2025) and the United States (16 percent in 1979 to 21 percent in 2025). Birol is also a reluctant convert. He recognizes energy security now largely as a foil to promote his political agenda for a rapid pivot to “new energy architecture.” The question before the house is whether Birol’s comments yesterday are the best assessment of the current state of global energy affairs or another contrarian indicator.
Equities seem to have a view. Against this backdrop, the S&P 500 has recovered to pre-war levels. Goldman Sachs reported Monday that its FICC revenue fell 10 percent year-over-year despite the most volatile commodity environment in decades, an outcome that suggests the franchise was positioned defensively rather than aggressively through the disruption. JPMorgan Chase (JPM) and Wells Fargo (WFC) reported this morning. JPM showed a +13% increase in net income to $16.5 billion ($5.94 per share vs Street at $5.45). WFC showed a +7% increase in earnings. The question is whether executives can credibly guide forward through diesel above $5.65 per gallon and a strait that remains functionally closed. Birol’s assumption that oil shock always trigger recession is too glib. The true answer is maybe.
The physical market and the equity market are not pricing two incompatible realities. But one is feverishly jumping from the sickbed without medicine, while the other sees the pain before the cure. We observe that barrels take their lumps faster than share prices, and that the IEA's 205 million barrel draw from non-Gulf inventories in a single month is not a temperature reading that falls on a phone call. U.S. Energy Secretary Wright is correct: prices stay high until hulls clear the Strait. No hulls have cleared in commercial volume. The cure for this crisis is not a deal. The cure is a tanker, fully laden, arriving at a discharge port in Ulsan or Jamnagar or Rotterdam on a schedule the buyer can underwrite. Until that happens, the pain is the price, and the price is the truth.
----------------------
Bottomline: There is no "Quick Fix" for the damage that has been done to the world's most important supply chain. This world runs on fossil fuels and more $Trillions spent on windmills and solar panels will NOT change that. The NYMEX strip is not a forecast and spot market oil prices remain much higher than the strip. A "Paper Agreement" with Iran is not worth much more than the paper it is written on.
Dan Steffens
Energy Prospectus Group
Energy Prospectus Group